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1 Introduction
The anticipated effects of climate change range from a threat to our standards of living to total catas-
trophe. In recent years, national leaders from the large majority of countries have had conversations
and signed regional and global agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The two most notorious
examples of such agreements are the Kyoto Protocol (in 1997) and the Paris Agreement (in 2015),
which had a worldwide positive effect on the amount of regulations on emissions.
Between 2009 and 2019, at least 1524 laws have been passed, among all countries, either mitigating
or adapting to climate change (Eskander et al., 2020).1 On the other hand, countries have different
levels of commitment to climate change (Mehling et al., 2018). For example, in that same period of
time, the 36 richest countries have passed an average of 8.63 climate change laws by country, while
the 37 poorest countries have passed an average of 5.59.2
The carbon leakage theory predicts that heterogeneity of regulations will cause higher emissions
in less-regulated countries. What is worse, typically, the developing and low productivity countries
are the ones who cannot afford to regulate their emissions.3 Thus, one would expect that higher
productivity is usually positively associated with more stringent regulations. Indeed, going back to
the previous example, the average total factor productivity among the 36 richest countries in the last
10 years is three times higher than that of the 37 poorest countries.4
In this study, we analyze the effects that heterogeneous regulations have on global emissions. More
specifically, we argue that (due to carbon leakage) ‘not in my backyard’ policies have not only increased
the greenhouse gas emissions in unregulated countries, but because of the productivity gap, they have
1See figure 4 for an example of the distribution of those laws.
2This is, without considering the effectiveness of each country’s policies; which would indeed compound the issue.
3For example, see the discussion on fairness such as Raworth (2007) and Baer (2002).
4See figure 1.
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actually increased net global emissions. The rationale behind this hypothesis is very simple: due to
lower productivity, unregulated countries need to use more inputs, and thus more energy, in order to
supply the regulated-country’s demand for products.
For our estimations, we use fuel emissions data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and
climate laws data from the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
(LSE/GRICCE), to construct a country-level panel from 1971 to 2016. In addition, we use covariates,
such as GDP, population, capital, measures for trade and measures for productivity from the Penn
World Tables (PWT).
Our contribution to the literature can be listed in three main categories: (i) We take a quantitative
approach to the study of the LSE/GRICCE’s data on climate laws; (ii) estimate the effectiveness of
climate policy-making on a global scale; and finally, (iii) attempt to measure the net global effects
that carbon leakage has on emissions, and consequently on global pollution. Moreover, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the first study to do any of the three mentioned categories.5
Our results show that, the effectiveness of climate laws within the country of origin (the country
passing the law) seem to work better among high-income countries. Thus, regulations do not work
uniformly across all types of countries. Moreover, when we repeat the exercise to study the effect
of foreign climate laws on countries’ emissions, we show that regulations in high income countries
actually accelerate global emissions. Finally, by comparing the predicted emissions of our estimated
panel under the observed laws and myopically coordinated laws, we estimate the additional emissions
(or the abatement loss) that came from the lack of coordination.
The policy implications of our findings contribute to the efforts on linking nations’ climate policy.
5Eskander et al. (2020) have descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis using the climate laws data-set. The direct
but isolated economic effects of some climate laws have been studied see for example Andersson (2019); Metcalf and
Stock (2020). Finally, the carbon leakage literature has mainly focused on regional effects (such as the EU or the US).
See the discussion in next section.
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Namely, our results are a call for international coordination and cooperation in order to achieve a
sustainable global economy. Ideally, high income countries should provide appropriate incentives to
low income countries to reduce their emissions too. Since nowadays negative externalities have great
international consequences, we believe that it is time to think more about a global economy.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we discuss previous studies that
inspired our work, present our hypothesis, and discuss our estimation strategy. In section 3, we
summarize the data sets used in this study. In section 4, we present the results from the econometric
estimation, and in section 5 we propose an example to measure the cost of the lack of coordination in
terms for emissions. Finally, we conclude in section 6.
2 Theoretical Motivation
Related Literature
Our study is motivated by theoretical and empirical studies from the carbon leakage literature, as
well as more general subjects such as energy, environment, economics, law, and economic integration
under the carbon pricing linkage. Carbon leakage can be roughly defined as the displacement of
CO2eq emissions from regulated nations towards non-regulated nations. The leakage could vary in
magnitude, depending on the sector and the scope of the policy (Baylis et al., 2013). After the two
mayor agreements in climate change policy, the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and (to a lesser extent) the
Paris agreement in 2015, some countries implemented binding and non-binding constrains to CO2eq
emissions. However, the market effects have lead to offsetting emission increases in the countries
without active regulations.
4
Following Wald (2015) the carbon leakage literature is divided in two large branches: (i) the theo-
retical ex-ante approach, that compares different scenarios against a synthetic counterfactual context
where the simulated policy generate economic impacts; and, (ii) the ex-post approach, which uses
historical data of emissions and production to identify the changes of patterns in emissions.
Two of the most notorious theoretical studies are Bohom (1993) and Copeland and Taylor (1995).
They study how unilateral regulations reduce fuel usage, causing a downturn in world-market fuel
prices, and thus increasing the consumption of fuels elsewhere. Those theories were later complemented
with simulations, by several computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. These CGE simulations
have consistently found positive leakage effects at the national or sub national level.6
The empirical literature on carbon leakage focused on regional effects. There are several studies on
the environmental policies implemented by the EU, and their effects on their members. For instance,
Barker et al. (2007) conclude that after the introduction of carbon taxes in six European members there
is small or no evidence on leakages around its industries.7 On the other hand, there are fewer studies
on the US economy. One of the most recent ones is Fowlie et al. (2016), who asses the implications
of alternative policies imposing constrains to CO2eq emission in the cement industry, to show that
regulations exacerbated the market power in the industry, and that carbon leakage of traded goods
6Fullerton et al. (2011) and Babiker (2005) uses both multisector and commodities approach in a global set, with no
explicit price of CO2eq estimation. Evidence using a range of carbon prices, multi sector breakdown, and considering
Kyoto’s Annex I countries and non-Annex I, can be found in Burniaux and Martins (2000), Caron (2012), Carbone
(2013), Gerlagh and Kuik (2007), Lanzi et al. (2013), Monjon and Quirion (2009) and Kuik (2009) including mineral
sector analysis. Paroussos et al. (2015), Kuik and Hofkes (2010), Baylis et al. (2013), Gerlagh and Kuik (2014), Rocco
et al. (2020) and Zhang et al. (2020) present long term simulation forecasting considering the irruption of China as a
main player in the emissions composition.
7Some other examples study the three phases of implementation of the European Trade System (EU-ETS) in the
European Union between 2005 and 2020, which were analyzed separately and jointly in the literature with not significant
evidence. For example, Cummins (2013) focus just on the phase II (2008-2012) of the EU-ETS in a panel regression,
and finds no evidence of leakage. In the same line, Abrell et al. (2011) and Chan et al. (2013) consider phases I and
II, and focus on specific sectors such as energy, cement, iron, and steel; they find no evidence of leakage. More recently
Verde (2020) summarized the literature, emphasising on the empirical approach, and the general consensus seems to be
that there is no evidence of leakage inside EU-ETS.
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offsets local reductions.
In addition, our study is related to the Environmental Kuznet Curve (EKC), which addresses the
challenges to measure and analyze the relationship between economic development and environmental
quality.8 The EKC proposes an inverse U-shape of emissions as a function of economic development.
This relates to our study because it shows how once a country has reached certain threshold, it cares
about the environment and can afford to abate. On the other hand, developing countries cannot afford
to reduce emissions.9 Furthermore, following Cohen et al. (2018), a major environmental attention is
associated with higher levels of development. There is a growing evidence showing that the reductions
of pollutants is associated with higher levels of development (Uchiyama, 2016) and more recently
(O¨zcan and O¨ztu¨rk, 2019). Overall, it is known that high-income countries tend to introduce both
pricing and ‘command and control’ regulations to mitigate environmental problems.
Hypothesis
To summarize the literature, the carbon leakage literature theoretically predicts a non-zero leakage
with possible positive net effects on global scales; while the empirical evidence has mixed results
focusing only on specific regions (as opposed to the globe). Moreover, the EKC predicts that countries
with a high level of development will usually be the ones to regulate their emissions.
Our hypothesis is that the net global effect of carbon leakage is indeed positive. The reason is a
combination of two aspects that we believe are widely accepted: (i) countries that typically regulate
happen to also have higher productivity, and, (ii) countries with lower productivity need more inputs
for production. Combining those two propositions, it follows that the observed higher levels of reg-
8To date, the EKC approach was tested in different contexts, such as global pollutants (like CO2eq) and local
pollutants, like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, suspended particulate matter (PM).
9This point also relates to the topic of fairness; namely, who should abate? Some attempts to address this topic are
Morrow (2017); Rodr´ıguez-Ferna´ndez et al. (2020); Shue (1995), to cite a few.
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ulation in productive countries has outsourced the production of emitting goods to less productive
countries. Those less productive countries, in turn, ended up using even more fossil fuels; and, thus,
increasing net global emissions.10
Thus, from our hypothesis, one would expect to find the following empirical results: (i) although
climate laws from developed countries may have a negative effect on their own emissions, (ii) those
laws will actually have a positive effect on net global emissions, or equivalently, a positive effect on
the emissions of the average country.
Indeed, there are several studies supporting (theoretically) the international linkage of climate laws.
For example, Mehling et al. (2018) states that, although targets are not binding, the Paris agreement
has achieved a key condition for success: setting a precedent of cooperation. Then, they proceeds to
analyze and propose possible ways to implement regulations that are linked across nations.11
Estimation Strategy
We model emissions as a function of a country’s own laws and foreign laws. We construct a panel
at the country level, with data on emissions, laws, and macroeconomic variables. We use country
and time fixed effects, to capture country specifics (culture, institutions, neighborhood, etc) and time
specifics (time trends and fluctuations). In order to measure the effect that foreign laws have on each
country, we want to distinguish whether the foreign law came from a wealthy country or not. Thus,
we classify the laws in four groups according to GDP per capita quartiles. Finally, we estimate our
model using linear regressions.
10In other words, one can see the marginal cost of abatement as the ‘cost of opportunity’ from reducing the production
of emitting goods. This cost of opportunity is directly related to productivity: the loss from not producing is high if
productivity is high.
11Other examples are Agostini et al. (1992); Parry et al. (2016); Chan et al. (2018); Schmalensee and Stavins (2019);
Aldy and Stavins (2020); Nordhaus (2015).
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Although we agree that the approval of a climate law is not a random event, we are skeptical to
believe this fact severely affects our results. First of all, it is not clear that climate laws depends on
a country’s emissions. The political economy literature has shown us that politicians mostly react to
their prospects of power (see for example Downs (1957); Mayhew (1974)), and this holds true regarding
climate laws (Downton and Pielke Jr, 2001). One possible counter-argument could be that due to the
recent notorious changes in climate, the younger generations are pushing their governments to address
this issue. However, our usage of time fixed-effects captures the mentioned changes in the trend.12
Second, and more importantly, we focus on how foreign laws affect a country’s own emissions. Thus,
it is difficult to believe any arguments implying that regulations from one country depend on the
emissions of another country.
3 Data
We use three data sets: climate laws from the LSE/GRICCE, emissions from the IEA, and macroeco-
nomic variables from PWT. Since our variables come from three different sources, there are mismatches
regarding the availability on some countries. We describe the size of our sample in detail below.
3.1 Climate Laws
We use the Climate Change Laws of the World (CCLW) data set from the LSE/GRICCE. There is
data from 199 countries from 1947 to 2020, listing all laws on emissions on each of those countries.13
12Another counter-argument could be that the Kyoto protocol is an example of governments passing laws based on
emissions. However, even if we include a dummy variable to capture Kyoto protocol countries in the relevant periods,
our results remain.
13The data-set is meant to be comprehensive; thus, any missing laws should be very exceptional cases. There is an
additional region labeled EU. For those laws, we added each of them to the respective EU countries taking into account
the year they joined the organization.
8
Laws are categorized by type of framework or type of response. We defined a law as having some degree
of mitigation if either the framework or the response have the word ‘mitigation.’ For our purpose, we
consider either all regulations, which we will refer as laws, and the laws that are not exclusively meant
to adapt to damages, which we will refer as mitigation laws.
Thus, our main variable lawsi,t will be the sum of all approved laws by country i on year t. Alter-
natively, our results are robust to mitigation laws (as defined above), and dummy variables for having
any law, or a dummy variable for having any mitigation. Similarly, we want to define a measure
for foreign laws.14 In addition, we want to explicitly make a distinction of foreign laws by different
income groups of countries. To do so, we divided the list of countries of each year t in four groups
G(t) ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, which we achieved by using income data as described in section 3.3.15 The variable
ext.lawsi,t,G(t) represents the laws from all countries in group G(t) that are foreign to country i. More
precisely, let Ii,G(t) be the indicator function for the event ‘country i belongs to group G(t).’ Then,
ext.lawsi,t,G(t) = −Ii,G(t)lawsi,t +
∑
j∈G(t) lawsj,t.
Table 1: Climate Change Laws of the World
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All laws 3868
Mitigation laws 732
Laws/year 87.85 57.23 28 175
Miti. Laws/year 23.95 24.51 0 68
Laws/country 59.46 36.88 1 112
Miti. Laws/country 9.03 5.85 0 22
Year 1947 2019
CCLW data-set from the LSE/GRICCE. A law is defined as mitigation if either the type of
framework or the type of response of the law have the word mitigation.
14The results are available upon request.
15Countries change income classification over time.
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3.2 Emissions
We use fuel emissions data from the IEA. The sample includes 145 countries from 1971 to 2017, and
emissions are measured in million metric tons. Thus, we define emissionsi,t as country i’s own fuel
emissions in year t.
Table 2: CO2 emissions from fuel in million metric tons
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
National Emissions 6113 166.96 636.25 0.06 9257.93
Growth Rate 3.33% 0.13 -77.03% 377.38%
World Emissions 21715.77 5482.87 13333.23 31461.51
World Growth Rate 1.90% 0.02 -1.27% 5.95%
Year 1971 2017
Emissions data from the IEA. Most of the observations for the growth rate are between −10%
and 20%. See the histogram on figure 5.
3.3 Covariates
Our most relevant covariate is productivity. We use PWT’s total factor productivity (TFP) as a
measure of productivity. To define the productivity of a country, we want a measure of TFP that
is standardized by the purchasing power parity (PPP), but, at the same time, captures the TFP’s
growth over time. In order to do so, we use the PPP adjusted TFP (variable name: CTFP ), which
is normalized at USA=1 (in all years). Then, we re-normalize it to real USA’s TFP to adjust for
productivity growth (variable name: RTFPNA). Thus, our measure of country i’s productivity on
year t is TFPi,t = CTFPi,t ×RTFPNAUSA,t.16
The remaining covariates for country i in period t are GDP per capita gdp.pci,t, stock of capital
16Alternatively, we also used GDP per worker as a measure of productivity. Our results remain robust to this
modification. The results are available upon request.
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per capita cap.pci,t, population popi,t, and exports csh.ei,t and imports csh.mi,t of goods, both as a
fraction of GDP. All these variables are also from the PWT. In addition, we also use want PWT’s gdp
to classify countries by income rank. For each year t, we divided the list of countries in four income
categories of about the same size: High Income, Medium-High Income, Medium-Low Income, and Low
Income.17
Table 3: Productivity and Others
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 9985 269192.80 1070178 19.78 18400000
Population 9985 30.74 114.57 0.00 1409.52
Capital 9959 908.76 3976.40 0.01 106000
RTFPNA 6006 0.99 0.35 0.23 7.11
CTFP 6006 0.71 0.29 0.02 3.61
TFP 6006 0.62 0.25 0.02 2.84
GDP/Labor Force 8841 29436.33 45683.89 485.81 1343052
Exports/GDP 9985 0.23 0.26 -1.50 3.06
Imports/GDP 9985 -0.31 0.68 -26.74 23.16
Year 1950 2017
Data from the PWT. GDP is expressed in real 2011 million USD, at chained PPP, and capital
stock is measured in real 2011 billion USD, at chained PPP.
3.4 Policy Effectiveness
Since institutions affect the impact or effectiveness of a law, one should not expect to believe that
that laws from different countries have the same impact. As a robustness check, we adjust the impact
of laws by measures of policy effectiveness. We use two measures for this purpose. The first one is
17There is a mismatch between countries with emissions data and GDP data in the sample. Thus, simply using
percentiles would end up in very heterogeneous sized groups. In order to solve this issue we: (i) divide countries with
existing GDP data in 5 quintiles. Groups 1 to 3 remain untouched. Groups 4, 5 and the remaining mismatched countries,
are all collapsed as the 4th group. This is not perfect, but it’s a reasonable approximation, since most countries that
mismatch are usually small and low income economies. In addition, we also used Human Development Index (HDI) to
classify countries into four groups as a robustness check. However, the HDI index only starts from 1990, and there are
also mismatched countries. Nevertheless, our results remain robust when using the HDI index. The results are available
upon request.
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Kaufmann’s Government Effectiveness Estimate (GEE).18 There are two drawbacks of this measure:
(i) the sample only starts in 1996 and even after that some years are missing; and (ii) the measure
captures all government policies, which includes a large range of industries. In addition, using all data
described in the previous sections, we created our own Climate Law Effectiveness (CLE) index. The
methodology is explained in appendix B. The advantages of this index are that the sample obviously
matches our sample, and that it is specific to climate laws. The disadvantages from both indexes is
that the unit of measure is subjective and does not have a clear interpretation.19
Table 4: Policy Effectiveness
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GEE 9408 -0.06 0.97 -2.48 2.44
CLE 0.04 1.00 -4.59 2.76
Both indexes were normalized to have a SD of 1. However, there are a few mismatches between
Kaufmann’s GEE, that is why the measured SD slightly differs from 1. In addition, our CLE
was constructed from the existing data. Thus, all observations are available.
4 Results
4.1 Basic Results
As previously explained, we categorized the list of countries by income group for each year. We argue
that income captures development, and thus following the theoretical prediction of the EKC, one would
expect that the number of laws are correlated with the income group. In addition, the most relevant
driving force that links the inverse U-shape of the EKC and abatement is technological advance, which
18Kraay et al. (2010)
19We matched Kaufmann’s units to get an index, roughy speaking, between -2.5 and 2.5. Then, the adjusted measure
of law will be 100% plus the score of the index used.
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we measure as the TFP. Thus, to strengthen our claim, we also show that the TFP is associated with
the income group. These two relations are displayed in figure 1.
Figure 1: Income, Productivity and Climate Laws
(a) Income Group and Laws (b) Income Group and Productivity
4.2 Own Regulations
As a benchmark, we first estimate a model on how a country’s own regulations affect their emissions.
Our dependent variable is the log of emissions. Our main explanatory variables are the measure for
laws, productivity, and their interaction. In addition, we control by other variables that clearly affect
emission, such as log of GDP per capita, log of population, log of capital stock, and exports and imports
both as a share of GDP. Finally, we use country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a combination of
income-group and year fixed effects whenever pertinent. Thus, our first model is:
lemissionsi,t = β0 + β1lawsi,t + β2lawsi,tTFPi,t + β3TFPi,t + Controlsi,t + νi + ut + ei,t (1)
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Table 5 shows the results for the above estimation. Columns (1) and (2) estimate the effects of the
average law on the average country’s own emissions. The difference between them is that column (1)
assumes that the time fixed effect is the same for all countries, while column (2) allows for it to have
different effects depending on the income group. Column (2) shows that the the average law of the
average country has been ineffective at best.
Table 5: Emissions, Regulations and Productivity
log emissions
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
laws 0.0870*** 0.0288 -0.0828* -0.0909* 0.0670** 0.157***
(0.0205) (0.0220) (0.0462) (0.0452) (0.0306) (0.0415)
laws*Productivity -0.142*** -0.0571** 0.0629 0.106 -0.100* -0.305***
(0.0293) (0.0289) (0.0477) (0.0629) (0.0518) (0.0910)
Productivity -0.544*** -0.680*** -0.504*** -0.890*** -0.325 0.116
(0.0762) (0.0860) (0.110) (0.132) (0.218) (0.195)
log gdp/pc 1.364*** 0.755*** 7.290*** -2.437*** 6.078*** -0.888
(0.187) (0.235) (0.712) (0.533) (0.609) (0.529)
(log gdp/pc)2 -0.0410*** -0.00296 -0.333*** 0.192*** -0.303*** 0.0814**
(0.0106) (0.0134) (0.0337) (0.0278) (0.0329) (0.0329)
log pop 1.545*** 1.514*** 1.382*** 2.326*** 1.430*** 1.417***
(0.0468) (0.0653) (0.0772) (0.0631) (0.131) (0.134)
log capital -0.0805*** -0.128*** -0.00566 -0.0485 0.0216 0.0397
(0.0189) (0.0280) (0.0561) (0.0477) (0.0497) (0.0522)
exports/gdp -0.135** -0.127* 0.192** -0.522*** 0.211 -0.714***
(0.0595) (0.0691) (0.0910) (0.125) (0.126) (0.172)
imports/gdp -0.281*** -0.228*** 0.0870 -0.502*** -0.388*** -1.089***
(0.0487) (0.0593) (0.0851) (0.112) (0.122) (0.233)
Constant -9.657*** -6.387*** -37.29*** 4.360* -31.54*** -0.602
(0.810) (0.991) (3.714) (2.350) (2.698) (1.972)
Observations 4,337 4,337 1,240 1,124 956 1,017
Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time F.E. Yes – Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time*Group F.E. – Yes – – – –
Income Group All All High Mid-Hi Mid-Lo Low
Panel of emissions and own regulations. ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001. The variable law
represents the number of regulations of a country in a year, and its effectiveness was adjusted
by our CLE index. Errors were clustered by year on column (1) and by year-group on columns
(2) to (6). Robust errors are displayed in parenthesis.
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On the other hand, the previous result that ‘the average law’ is ineffective is no longer true if we do
a sub-sample analysis. Columns (3) to (4) show that regulations of higher income countries actually
reduce their own emissions. On the other hand, Columns (5) and (6) show the opposite result: policies
in low-income countries are associated with increases in emissions.20 Thus, one could mistakenly
conclude that low income countries should not pass environmental policies, or at least heavily improve
their effectiveness. Nevertheless, this analysis does not show how the decisions of one country affect
the other. That is, the effects of foreign policies are either not taken into consideration.
4.3 Foreign Regulations
Figure 1 and table 5 showed us that the income groups heavily affect the relationship between climate
laws, productivity and emissions. Next, we study how foreign regulations affect the emissions of the
average country. Our dependent variable is still the log of emissions, we still use own regulations and the
control variables from equation (1). In addition, we add and focus on foreign regulations ext.lawsi,t,G(t)
as the main explanatory variable. Finally, we want to study how the effects of regulations persist over
time. Thus, our testable model is describe by the following equation:
lemissionsi,t = β0 + β1lawsi,t−τ + β2lawsi,t−τTFPi,t−τ + β3TFPi,t−τ (2)
+
4∑
g(t−τ)=1
[
γ1,g(t−τ)ext.lawsi,t−τ,g(t−τ) + γ2,g(t−τ)ext.lawsi,t−τ,g(t−τ)TFPi,t−τ
]
+ Controlsi,t + νi + ut + ei,t , for τ = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
20The results on columns (5) and (6) are robust to using Kaufmann’s Governance Effectiveness and not adjusting at
all. The coefficients for law on columns (3) and (4), although remain negative, become insignificant when changing the
adjustment for law effectiveness.
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where τ represents the lag on the policy variable, and we are mainly interested in estimating the set
of γ parameters.
Table 6: Foreign Regulation
log emissions
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
law -0.0614* -0.00869 -0.00568 -0.00678 -0.00924
(0.0327) (0.0220) (0.0233) (0.0230) (0.0224)
law*Productivity 0.0600 -0.0149 -0.0184 -0.0154 -0.0122
(0.0469) (0.0292) (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0296)
ext.laws.G1 0.0199 0.0272** 0.0421*** 0.0485*** 0.0421***
(0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0141) (0.0121)
ext.laws.G1*Prodctvt -0.00430 0.000530 -0.00279 -0.00173 -0.000926
(0.00452) (0.00408) (0.00556) (0.00494) (0.00531)
ext.laws.G2 0.0295*** 0.0377*** 0.0278* 0.0213 0.0225
(0.00892) (0.0119) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141)
ext.laws.G2*Prodctvt -0.0103* -0.0137*** -0.0111* -0.00687 -0.00856*
(0.00528) (0.00479) (0.00564) (0.00543) (0.00458)
ext.laws.G3 -0.0256* 0.00915 0.0203 0.0275 0.0430*
(0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0214) (0.0238) (0.0237)
ext.laws.G3*Prodctvt 0.00990 0.0106 0.00861 -0.00238 -0.00701
(0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0179) (0.0165) (0.0164)
ext.laws.G4 -0.0605*** -0.0314** -0.0284 -0.00437 0.00590
(0.0163) (0.0134) (0.0198) (0.0221) (0.0207)
ext.laws.G4*Prodctvt -0.00279 -0.00393 -0.000917 -0.00585 -0.00488
(0.0105) (0.0111) (0.0140) (0.0151) (0.0147)
Productivity -0.374*** -0.331*** -0.296*** -0.270*** -0.225**
(0.0982) (0.0949) (0.0943) (0.0933) (0.0937)
Observations 3,826 3,753 3,681 3,609 3,528
Panel of emissions and foreign regulations. ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001. Control
variables and a constant term were used, but omitted from the table for brevity. All regressions
have country fixed effects and a combination of group and year fixed effects. Errors were clustered
by year-group. Robust errors are displayed in parenthesis. Laws were adjusted by our index
CLE. See appendix B.
Table 6 estimates equation (2). Column (1) to (5) estimate the effect of foreign laws on a the average
country’s emissions. Column (1) uses the same period’s law, while column (τ) uses regulations from
period t − τ + 1. The coefficients for ext.laws.G1 are all positive and significant for columns (2) to
(5). This shows that lagged climate laws implemented by the richest countries have actually increased
the emissions of the average country. For instance, the largest coefficient for this variable is 0.0485 in
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column (4). Since emissions are in logarithms, the estimated coefficient is a semi elasticity with the
following interpretation: an increase of one law passed by one of the high-income countries multiplies
the emissions by e0.0485, which represents almost a 5% increase.
Moreover, our results from tables 5 and 6 are robust to several modifications. Namely, (i) restricting
the sample to post-cold war era; (ii) using world bank data for emissions instead of IEA’s data; (iii)
using the number of mitigation laws in a year, a dummy indicating if there is any law in a year, and a
dummy indicating if there is a mitigation law in a year; (iv) using Kaufmann’s GEE or not adjusting
the laws.
5 Measuring Non-Coordination
The results from table 6 show that foreign laws from developed countries increase the emissions of the
average country, and, to some extent, foreign laws from developing countries decrease the emissions
on the average country. In this section, we re-estimate the model specification from table 6, but use
simultaneously current and lagged foreign laws up to three periods. That is:
lemissionsi,t = β0 +
3∑
τ=0
[
β1lawsi,t−τ + β2lawsi,t−τTFPi,t−τ + β3TFPi,t−τ (3)
+
4∑
g(t−τ)=1
[
γ1,g(t−τ)ext.lawsi,t−τ,g(t−τ) + γ2,g(t−τ)ext.lawsi,t−τ,g(t−τ)TFPi,t−τ
]]
+ Controlsi,t + νi + ut + ei,t , for τ = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
Then, we compare two case scenarios. The first one is the fitted emissions that the model would
predict between 1980 and 2016. For the second scenario, we replace the laws by the yearly average
17
law, and then predict the alternative emissions that would come from ‘myopic coordination,’ where
we define myopic coordination as a sub-optimal coordination such that countries mimic each other
instead of taking into account the advantages of the differentials in productivity. On the other hand,
since the right hand side of equation (3) is linear in foreign laws, we believe that the analysis already
over-compensates for using a sub-optimal coordination. Figure 2 shows the comparison of these two
scenarios. We calculate that the accumulation of emissions under the coordination scenario would be
60% of its uncoordinated (using the observed laws) counterpart.
Figure 2: Comparing no coordination and myopic coordination, from 1980 to 2016.
The above exercise shows that it is possible to reduce emissions with coordination. On the other
hand, the exact magnitude is clearly far from perfect for several reasons. First, we are restricted to
the data. Our sample size is the intersection of three main data-sets, and, thus, even the predicted
model without adjustments already has lower emissions to begin with. Second, we assume that other
variables are not affected. Namely, GDP did not change between the two scenarios. Third, our exercise
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exclusively focuses on the trade-off between production and abatement. On the other hand, techno-
logical progress can increase abatement without compromising production. Although technological
progress is controlled by TFP, we do not explicitly focus in that variable.
In addition to the points describe above, one adjustment that we can make with the available data is
to take into account that productivity is decreasing as as function of production (or production exhibits
diminishing returns to scale). This would imply that the change in laws should also have a decreasing
impact on carbon leakage, as productivity from regulated and unregulated countries slowly converge.
Thus, a concave transformation of the variable laws in equation (3) should make the comparison
between the predicted emissions with actual laws and with modified laws less dramatic. We used
two alternative specifications, one is quadratic and the other one is logarithmic. The comparisons are
displayed in figure 3.
Figure 3: Comparing the efficiency loses w, from 1980 to 2016.
Figure 3 shows the the differences between the predicted emissions with actual laws and with mod-
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ified laws for three different functional forms for the variable laws: linear (the difference between the
two lines in figure 2), quadratic and logarithmic. The quadratic function is almost identical to the
linear one, but the logarithmic presents a much smaller difference. More importantly, in all cases the
alternative scenario with modified laws had lower emissions than the scenario with observed laws.
Two interesting points from figure 3 are that, (i) there seems to be a small but positive global
abatement attained exactly at the beginning of the Kyoto protocol, which can be attributed to the
fact that regulations are effective in the own country, specially for high-income countries. However,
(ii) the net effect quickly became negative (or positive loss in the graph) after year 2000. This also
relates to evidence of recent emissions take-off, especially from developing nations.21
6 Conclusions
We have studied the global effect of uncoordinated (or at least only partially coordinated) regulations
that originally attempted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although we show that industrialized
countries’ own regulations have decreased their own emissions, we also show that regulations from
those same countries increased emissions in unregulated countries. More importantly, the net effect
has been an increase in global emissions. Our results are relevant considering the current state of
climate laws distribution and heterogeneous productivity around the world.
Theoretically, the reason to our findings is that abating one additional metric ton of CO2eq represents
a higher cost of opportunity in high-productivity countries. Unfortunately, those countries are also the
ones regulating. Thus, we would be better off by finding a mechanism such we first reduce emissions
in low-productivity countries.
21For example, see (Zhang et al., 2020; Rocco et al., 2020; Sengupta and Bhardwaj, 2004; Arroyo-Curra´s et al., 2015).
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To estimate how present and past foreign laws affect emissions, we constructed a panel with data
from the majority of countries. We also compared the predicted emissions from the empirical model
with a hypothetical scenario. On the predicted emissions, we used the actual heterogeneous laws
observed in the data, and on the hypothetical scenario we assumed that each country implemented
the average yearly number of laws. This exercise shows that, in the hypothetical scenario, global
accumulated emissions from 2008 until now would be half as much as the predicted ones. Although
these results are only for illustration, rather than for policy evaluation, there is no doubt that moving
the regulations in the direction proposed would decrease global emissions.
The immediate implication is clearly adverse: the lack of global coordination and planning has had
a detrimental effect on the goals to stop/slowdown climate change. Partial coordination, such as the
Kyoto protocol, is not enough to achieve a sustainable global plan for emissions. Although the Kyoto
protocol allows for the incumbents to substitute their own abatement for a measurable reduction in a
third party’s emissions, this mechanism was only meant to be used as a secondary source of abatement.
Thus, we believe laws ideally need to be coordinated, which is an idea already proposed in the literature
(for example Mehling et al. (2018)).
Moreover, there are a few different tools that can be used to provide the right incentives to all
countries. The one that is most appealing, at least theoretically, is a global cap-and-trade. A second
solution would be a global carbon tax, as proposed by the IMF (2019). Based on our productivity
rationale, a global version of standard environmental economics policy techniques will make high
income countries purchase emission rights from low income countries. We believe this sounds appealing
from the efficiency perspective and also from the fairness perspective.
Of course, there are difficulties to such international agreement. Some countries may not be willing
to participate. Some countries may sign and misreport their (difficult to measure) emissions. In
21
addition, there are few other technical difficulties. For instance, there is no obvious way to setting the
emissions cap. Should it be a flat cap for all countries? Or should it be determined by population?
Or GDP per-capita? Or based on historical emissions? This discussion of setting the cap goes back
to a lingering issue in the environmental economics field: property rights. Another difficulty is that
countries have to be willing to maintain their allegiance to the agreement even in the difficult years
to come. This relates to the self-enforcing mechanisms on international agreements (Caro-Burnett,
2018).
One relevant variable that is beyond the scope of this study is technology. Implicitly, our theoreti-
cal rationale relies on the fact that there is a trade-off between production and abatement. However,
technology could allow for an improvement in both directions (i.e. expand the Pareto frontier). Empir-
ically, we controlled for total factor productivity which is a standard measure for technology. However,
it would be interesting to explicitly incorporate and focus on technological progress theoretically and
possibly empirically. Nevertheless, our conjecture is that, since the marginal cost of abatement is
higher in developed countries, the first countries where experimental technologies are adopted should
be developing countries.
There is no doubt that there is more research needed. However, our results are clear and ex-post
obvious. Ideally, all countries should coordinate, and emissions should first be reduced in countries
where the marginal cost of (opportunity of) abatement is low. We hope our study is a first step in the
right direction towards a better understanding in this exciting and immensely relevant topic.
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A Figures
Figure 4: Evolution of the number of laws by country, years 1992, 2000, 2008, and 2016
(a) Year=1992 (b) Year=2000
(c) Year=2008 (d) Year=2016
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Figure 5: Histogram of emissions growth rates
B Climate Laws Effectiveness
As an alternative to Kaufmann’s GEE, we used our data to measure which country-year pairs have
relatively more effective laws. We estimated a model similar to equation (1), but without the laws
variables:
lemissionsi,t = β0 + β1TFPi,t + Controlsi,t + νi + ut + ei,t
Then, we compared the predicted log-emissions (fitted lemissionsi,t) with the observed counterpart.
We measure effectiveness as:
CLEi,t = (−lemissionsi,t + fitted lemissionsi,t) , if lawsi,t > 0
30
Then, we re-normalized this index to have a SD of one, similar to Kaufmann’s GEE.
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